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I.  INTRODUCTION 
As we move towards an almost certain comprehensive federal law to 
address climate change,1 increasing attention is being paid to what will 
happen to state and local climate change and climate change-related 
programs that have arisen in this country in the last few years.2  As the 
symposium demonstrated, California has a particular concern that 
federal law might block its environmental and climate change policies. 
The debate has generally been fought between businesses that favor 
preemption and environmental interests that prefer no preemption.3  At a 
recent federal hearing on the Waxman-Markey draft bill (April 2009), 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce argued for a full state preemption 
provision while the National Association of Clean Air Agencies argued 
to eliminate any preemption language in the bill.4  According to William 
Kovacs, U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s vice president for environment, 
technology, and regulatory affairs: 
Compliance with the federal cap-and-trade program set by [the draft legislation] 
will undoubtedly be very complicated for businesses, who will be forced to 
comply with hundreds of new regulations and mandates.  To tack on a 
state program, or a regional program, or both, is to make an already cumbersome 
cost of compliance tantamount to an incentive to relocate a business to another 
state, or, worse yet, another country.5 
Conversely, Bill Becker of the National Association of Clean Air Agencies 
explained that retaining states’ rights to regulate was important.  Becker 
stated, “[I]f the bill is weakened as it moves through the legislative 
process, and yet [if the preemption of states] remains, states would be 
required to surrender their successful programs and revenue in exchange 
for an inferior federal program.”6 
Both sides can find support in prior environmental law.  Most current 
environmental control regimes explicitly allow states to go above federal 
health-based environmental standards, if they choose, in the air, water, 
 1. Victor B. Flatt, Federal Climate Change Legislation-The Perspective From 
2008, 3 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 195, 195 (2008). 
 2. See William Andreen, Federal Climate Change Legislation and Preemption, 3 
ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 261 (2008); Ann Carlson, Energy Efficiency and Federalism, 
107 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 63 (2008); Robert Glicksman & Richard Levy, A 
Collective Action Perspective on Ceiling Preemption by Federal Environmental 
Regulation: The Case of Climate Change, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 579, 580 (2008). 
 3. Andreen, supra note 2, at 267-68. 
 4. Robin Bravender, Enviros, States Caution Against Preemption Language in 
Waxman-Markey Bill, E&E DAILY, Apr. 27, 2009, http://www.eenews.net/EEDaily/2009/ 
04/27/8/ (on file with author). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
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and hazardous waste arenas.7  However, the restriction on state deviation 
from federal car-manufacturing standards is one notable exception to 
states’ ability to require stringent standards above federal requirements; 
California is the lone exception.8 
One possible way to understand this historic distinction is to separate 
product and production standards from other health and safety standards.  
Professor Ann Carlson has suggested that “[e]ven proponents of a strong 
state role in environmental policymaking advocate federal preemption 
for the regulation of products for which there is a national market.”9  If 
business arguments to promote preemption consist of product or 
production arguments, then these may be re-characterized as solely 
“product pre-emption” arguments.  Similarly, environmentalist arguments 
that claim that refusing to preempt state environmental laws does not 
cause inefficiencies or harm might be criticized as having ignored 
circumstances that deal with products. 
Under this reasoning, product-based standards should generally be 
uniform while other health and safety standards could be subjected to 
more stringent state regulation. This, of course, fits with the general 
breakdown of power between the states and the federal government, in 
that the federal government is given exclusive jurisdiction over interstate 
commerce (to the benefit of all),10 but state and local governments are 
generally seen as better able to operate to protect health and safety 
interests through the exercise of localized police power.11 
Much understanding can be gained by examining the basis behind this 
distinction in federalism history.  For instance, the framers recognized a 
dichotomy between economic protectionism, which should be avoided 
for the benefit of all, and the states’ exercise of legitimate interests in 
protecting its citizens.12  Similarly, policies governing modern international 
trade recognize a similar separation; the trade policies generally prohibit 
 7. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2009); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1370 (2009); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6929 (2009). 
 8. 42 U.S.C. § 7543. 
 9. Ann Carlson, Energy Efficiency and Federalism, 107 MICH. L. REV. 
FIRST IMPRESSIONS 63, 67 (2008). 
 10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 11. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 565-67 (1995) (noting that the 
federal government does not have “general police powers” such as the states do); see 
also Alexandra Klass, State Innovations and Preemption: Lessons from State Climate 
Change Efforts, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1653, 1666 (2009). 
 12. Steven M. Simpson, Judicial Abdication and Rise of Special Interests, 6 CHAP. 
L. REV. 173, 205 (2003). 
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laws that favor one market or business interest over another but allow 
such when their primary purpose amounts to protecting the health and 
well-being of a country’s citizens.13 
However, this does not provide a simple solution to the question of 
which state and local climate change policies should be preempted.  First, is 
this dichotomy actually correct?  In her comment, Professor Carlson notes 
that empirical evidence suggests that separate state product standards 
may not be problematic.14  Even if the distinction between product and 
health and safety is valid, where do various climate change policies fall 
on this spectrum?  Are cap-and-trade schemes more like a product, meaning 
that it should be uniform, or more like a local health and safety requirement, 
meaning that a state should be allowed to tailor requirements to meet its 
own needs? 
Luckily, we can examine climate-change preemption outside of 
theory.  In most areas, almost 40 years of environmental federalism has 
allowed states to regulate beyond the federal government for the 
protection of their citizens, and we can examine this history empirically 
in order to determine whether and in which circumstances preemption is 
necessary.  In particular, we can observe when states have exercised 
their authority to go beyond federal-government protections and how 
this affects the well-being (economically and environmentally) of the 
country as a whole.  We can then analogize these to climate-change 
policies that currently exist and are subject to the preemption debate.15 
II. UNDERSTANDING THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND                                     
AGAINST PREEMPTION 
Professors Robert Glicksman and Richard Levy recently proposed a 
framework for viewing preemption in an environmental context, which 
tracks some of the theoretical reasons for and against preemption, as 
noted above.  According to Glicksman and Levy, preemption should be 
viewed as a means of understanding the allocation of power between the 
federal and state governments.16  Given this premise, they argue that 
federal preemption displacing states’ authority is justified only by a 
particularized reason, such as an economic or federalism interest.17  If no 
 13. Andrew Green & Tracy Epps, Is There a Role for Trade Measures in 
Addressing Climate Change?, 15 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 8 (2008). 
 14. Carlson, supra note 9, at 67. 
 15. Professor Klass’s article on how the dynamics of federalism should be influenced 
by state action is also an interesting way to approach the “dynamic federalism” which 
encompasses environmental laws. Klass, supra note 11, at 1655-57.  However, I am limiting 
my review of past environmental laws to traditional notions of explicit federalism. 
 16. Glicksman & Levy, supra note 2, at 580 (2008). 
 17. Id. at 589. 
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purpose is served by the preemption, then displacing sovereign state 
power is uncalled for.18 
The federal government should preempt state action, in Glicksman 
and Levy’s view, when the federal government proposes to address 
“collective action problems”—that is, problems that arise when state 
policymakers have perverse incentives to regulate, which is brought on 
when regulatory benefits accrue for their constituents but regulatory 
costs spread among citizens outside of their jurisdiction.19  Unfettered, 
such behavior would result in a state economic competition in which all 
states would create policies that initially might benefit their own citizens 
but, in the aggregate, hurt everyone20—a “commons” problem.21 
In the environmental context, Glicksman and Levy note that preemption 
in the environmental arena would, thus, be justified if and when “collective 
action problems create incentives for states to act individually to regulate 
in ways that are contrary to the interests of the states as a collective.”22  
According to their analysis, this justification substantiates the floor 
preemption common to most environmental laws, and it would permit 
states to regulate above federal floors if the state feels that such 
regulation is necessary.  The justification also validates preemption of 
some state Not-In-My-Back-Yard (NIMBY) policies, which would 
restrict locations of environmental negatives when the benefits are 
important to everyone.23 
Though Glicksman and Levy rightfully criticize the abuses of cost-
benefit application, their analysis can be summarized as favoring federal 
preemption if it is necessary to promote better, more cost-efficient 
outcomes for the entire country.24  If efficient outcomes exist overall 
without federal preemption, then preemption should be avoided.  Though 
not everything can be reduced to dollars and cents in determining what 
 18. Id. at 585, 88. 
 19. Id. at 592-93. 
 20. Glicksman and Levy refer to this as the basis behind the McCulloch v. 
Maryland decision, quoting Chief Justice Marshall. Id. at 592 n.64. 
 21. A “commons” problem occurs when persons have unfettered access to a 
commons resource and so deplete the resource faster than it could be sustained.  Everyone is 
ultimately better off with a sustained resource, but since no one has the legal right to bar 
others from the “commons,” everyone has an incentive to use as much as quickly 
as possible.  See generally Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 
1243 (1968), available at http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/162/3859/1243. 
 22. Glicksman & Levy, supra note 2, at 593. 
 23. Id. at 593-94. 
 24. Id. at 602-03, 608-10. 
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constitutes efficiency, one can examine costs on individuals, businesses, 
and the government, which may both generally result in shared 
nationwide burdens to the public as well as lie entirely within a single 
state’s boundaries.  Under this rubric, costs borne by everyone should be 
avoided if they are imposed for the sole benefit of the citizens of one 
state. 
Using this framework, we can analyze the operation of prior federal 
environmental laws, which generally preempt states from lessening 
environmental regulation but permit states to regulate more strictly if 
they choose.  In so doing, we can empirically observe when states utilize 
their power to exceed uniform federal regulation and where the costs and 
benefits of that exercise fall.  On one hand, if it appears that states utilize 
this power in a way that implies a collective action problem, then that 
may signify that our historic approach to federalism in environmental 
laws is not justified and, similarly, that climate change bills should be 
more aggressive in preempting state policies that might conflict with a 
uniform federal standard.  On the other hand, if the exercise of state 
regulatory prerogatives point to legitimate state interests that do not 
generally impose disproportionate external costs, then such a framework 
is by and large successful and could be applied to the climate change 
context to see where and on whom climate change regulatory burdens 
would likely fall. 
III. GOING BEYOND FEDERAL STANDARDS UNDER THE                           
CLEAN AIR ACT (CAA) 
The Clean Air Act contains an explicit savings clause that preserves 
state laws and common law with respect to general clean air protection 
(with the exception of regulation of mobile sources) if these laws reach 
beyond federal minimum regulations.25  Moreover, the very structure of 
the Clean Air Act’s enforcement of National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards (NAAQS) provides states with almost complete flexibility in 
determining how they will meet this standard within their own borders.26 
There are two important exceptions to this non-preemption in the 
CAA.  One, the federal government may not approve a state implementation 
plan if it has a significant detrimental impact on another state’s ability to 
 25. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2009) (“Except as otherwise provided in 
[sections preempting certain state regulation of moving sources] nothing in this chapter 
shall preclude or deny the right of any State or political subdivision thereof to adopt or 
enforce (1) any standard or limitation respecting emissions of air pollutants or (2) any 
requirement respecting control or abatement of air pollution . . . “). 
 26. Id. at § 7410. 
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meet the NAAQS.27  Two, the federal government may preempt states 
relative to mobile sources, but even this “exception” contains a significant 
provision that allows California to adopt a more stringent mobile-source 
standard; furthermore, other states may choose between the federal and 
California standards.28 
Therefore, in general, the Clean Air Act does not preempt state clean 
air standards and controls, even when state regulations extend beyond 
federal standards.  The Act does not preempt even were each state to 
choose a different standard for an otherwise similar source.  So how 
have the states exercised their ability to go beyond federal standards?  
Have they utilized them frequently?  If so, have they done so in a 
“negative” way, that is, in a way that favors their own citizenry at the 
expense of businesses, government, and consumers nationwide? 
Interestingly, despite states’ ability to regulate beyond federal standards, 
with respect to criteria pollutants, they have chosen not to do so.  In fact, 
the opposite is the case.  It is federal law that has pushed states to meet 
minimum standards of air quality within their own jurisdictions by 
continuing to create more severe penalties for states that fail to comply 
with minimum federal standards.29 
Conversely, while federal statutes reflect the federal primacy in air 
quality protection, on occasion, the states have had to pressure the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to implement these laws 
properly.  While each state has not pushed the EPA to act more stringently 
with respect to itself, states have had to generally push the EPA to 
enforce requirements that prohibit state implementation plans from 
causing significant failure of another state in meeting national air quality 
standards.30 
What explains this behavior?  Seemingly, with respect to states exceeding 
federal standards by imposing additional controls on sources in their 
own states, there is no incentive for them to do so.  Higher standards 
would simply cost businesses in the state more money, and the federal 
standards presumably provide sufficient protection.  However, there 
 27. Id. at § 7410 (a)(2)(D)(i)(I). 
 28. Id. at § 7543. 
 29. CRAIG JOHNSTON ET AL., LEGAL PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT 285 (2d ed. 
2007). 
 30. See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 249 F.3d 1032, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(“In August 1997, eight states submitted petitions requesting that the EPA find that 
stationary sources in upwind states contribute significantly to downwind air pollution”). 
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would be an incentive to push the EPA to require other states to control 
air pollutants that cause the host state harm because those costs would 
fall out-of-state, and the benefits would fall in-state. 
Through the lens of Glicksman and Levy, it would appear that, 
structurally, giving states the right to exceed federal standards in air 
quality does not create a collective action problem, i.e. there exists no 
situation in which states could improve the air quality in their own states 
at a cost to other states.  Although increasing air quality provisions could 
act as a sort of tax on products manufactured in a state, which could then 
be borne nationwide, states own costs in lost industry and tax benefits, 
presumably, more than offset such a nation-borne cost.  Indeed, the 
states would expectedly engage in a race to the bottom in air quality, 
which was one of the major justifications for the federal Clean Air Act 
and its minimum provisions in the first place.31 
Still, states’ attempts to induce the EPA to enforce existing minimum 
standards on other states’ transport of criteria air pollutants provides us 
with an example in which states can improve their own air quality by 
increasing costs outside their boundaries.  However, this does not amount to 
a “collective action problem” since it corrects distorted economic signals, 
instead of distorting correct ones.  In the parlance of Glicksman and 
Levy, not enforcing environmental standards on the states that push 
costs beyond their borders would be a failure to correct a state’s self-
interested action that harmed others.32 
The case of hazardous air pollutants is similarly illustrative.  With 
respect to hazardous air pollutants, states are given the ability to provide 
for additional controls on the sources of these pollutants beyond federal 
requirements.33  In this case, many states have exercised this grant of 
authority.34  These states still face additional costs because they have 
regulated above the federal minimum standard,35 but many state 
 31. Whether or not a race to the bottom has occurred was the subject of many 
articles in the late 1990s, but it is interesting to note that if the states would have had an 
incentive to increase their states own environmental health quality by going above a 
federal minimum, they generally have not done that either.  See generally Scott Saleska 
& Kirsten Engel, “Facts Are Stubborn Things”: An Empirical Reality Check in the 
Theoretical Debate on the Race to the Bottom in State Environmental Standard-setting, 8 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 55 (1998). 
 32. In the CAA, other states are harmed if they face the costs of effective regulation but 
must share the pollution harms of states that choose not to exercise effective control. 
 33. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.§ 7416 (retention of state authority); see also Victor B. 
Flatt, Gasping for Breath: The Administrative Flaws of Federal Hazardous Air Pollution 
Regulation and What We Can Learn From the States, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 107 (2007). 
 34. Flatt, supra note 33, at 123. 
 35. See, e.g., National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants From 
Petroleum Refineries, 72 Fed. Reg. 50,716, 50,726 (proposed Sept. 4, 2007) (discussion 
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governments also receive a benefit in the form of citizens’ improved 
health quality.36 
What accounts for the difference between transport of criteria air 
pollutants and hazardous air pollutants?  It appears that, unlike the 
situation for criteria air pollutants, there is serious concern that the 
federal government has not successfully protected citizens with respect 
to hazardous air pollutants.37  Therefore, states have continued with their 
own hazardous air pollution regulation and moved to issue their own 
controls to protect their citizens, even though the costs are primarily 
borne within the state itself.38  Notwithstanding, it seems that the need 
for states to protect their own citizens is not enough to spur some states 
to tackle hazardous air pollutant health problems, demonstrating again 
the incentive for some states to “race to the bottom.”39 
In summary, since the passage of the Clean Air Act in the 1970s, 
states have not exercised their prerogatives to regulate beyond control 
standards required to meet the minimum national ambient air quality 
standards but, rather, have exercised their prerogative to exceed federal 
standards with respect to hazardous air pollutants.  States have also acted 
to force the federal government to meet the federally mandated standards 
regarding air pollution transport, which was designed to avoid commons 
actions problems. 
IV. GOING BEYOND FEDERAL STANDARDS UNDER THE                             
CLEAN WATER ACT 
The Clean Water Act created a shared federalism program structure 
very similar to the Clean Air Act.  It has provisions that require specific 
performance standards as well as provisions that require the states to 
maintain a water quality level through point-source controls.40  The 
of costs of benzene control mechanisms in petroleum refineries, which were rejected by 
the EPA in its proposed residual risk rulemaking for petroleum refineries in 2007). 
 36. Flatt, supra note 33, at 123-24 (describing California’s two health based air 
toxics standards). 
 37. Id. at 121-22. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See, e.g., Andrea L. Clements et al., THE CONTROL OF AIR TOXICS: TOXICOLOGY 
MOTIVATION AND HOUSTON IMPLICATIONS, FINAL REPORT 2-3 (2006) (discussing pollution 
conditions and controls in Houston) (on file with the author) available at http://hydrology. 
rice.edu/ceve/fraser/FINAL %20MASTER.pdf. 
 40. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311–13 (2009).  A “point source” is defined 
as “any discernible, confined, and discrete conveyance.” Id. at § 1362(14). 
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Clean Water and Clean Air Acts differ mostly in that the Clean Water 
Act originally focused more on the point-source controls, whereas the 
Clean Air Act envisioned air quality through state work in the state-
implementation plans.41 
Nevertheless, the Clean Water Act also grants states the right to 
exceed federal standards—in language almost identical to that in the 
Clean Air Act42—and, through the joint federalism program, some 
leeway in reaching water quality standards.43  Additionally, under the 
Clean Water Act, states even have some flexibility regarding how 
stringently they may regulate water quality standards for specific 
waterways, which digresses from the Clean Air Act’s uniform 
requirements.44 
The experience of the states with respect to the Clean Water Act has 
been very similar to their experiences with the Clean Air Act.  The major 
problem has been getting the states to meet the minimum standards.45  
This is consistent with the theory that requiring applicants within a state 
to attain higher standards would be costly to the state, so the state would 
have no incentive to engage in such behavior.  Again, like the Clean Air 
Act, the Clean Water Act was designed to discourage states from 
engaging in the expected behavior that they would attempt to lower 
standards in order to attract business.46 
However, the Clean Water Act does require all federal permit applicants 
to certify that the granting of a permit will not violate state water quality 
standards.47  The history of this statutory-certification section supports 
the idea that states may use it to protect their own interests against other 
interests.  In 1995, the Supreme Court ruled that the Clean Water Act’s 
401 certification program allowed states to condition Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) licensing of hydroelectric facilities.48  
Since that time, courts have allowed states to successfully use 401 
 41. JOHNSTON ET AL., supra note 29, at 139. 
 42. 33 U.S.C. § 1370. 
 43. Though states have flexibility in how they will reach water quality standards, the 
Clean Water Act is more specific about procedural requirements.  The Clean Water Act 
anticipates effectuating the water quality standards through a specific method known as 
Total Maximum Daily Load (or TMDL). 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d).  For an example of state 
flexibility in determining how best to meet water quality standards for impaired waters, 
see Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123 (9th. Cir. 2002). 
 44. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c). 
 45. JOHNSTON ET AL, supra note 29, at 138. 
 46. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1025 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (discussing 
Congress’s insistence of establishing uniform standards across each industry). 
 47. This provision is otherwise known as “401 certification.” 33 U.S.C. § 1341. 




FLATT (DO NOT DELETE) 2/12/2016  12:59 PM 
[VOL. 1:  63, 2009]  State Action in the Environmental Realm 
  SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE AND ENERGY LAW 
certifications to stop or modify hydroelectric projects.49  This fits with 
Glicksman and Levy’s collective action theory, as protection of a state’s 
waters benefits those within the state, but the cost of losing hydroelectric 
power may reach beyond it. 
The case of Arkansas v. Oklahoma provides another example of states 
attempting to engage in collective action behavior.50  In this case, the 
State of Oklahoma challenged the EPA’s grant of a National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit to the city of Fayetteville, 
Arkansas for a publicly-owned treatment work.51  Oklahoma claimed that 
the discharges that would flow into Oklahoma added pollution to an 
already-impaired water body.52  The Supreme Court ruled that, while the 
EPA had to preserve Oklahoma’s water quality, the amount of pollutant 
added to the Oklahoma water body was de minimis.53  Although the 
State of Oklahoma lost the case, the facts illustrate how states might 
freely try to impose costs on other states, even for relatively small in-
state benefits. 
V.  LESSONS FROM HISTORY 
The aforementioned air and water examples generally indicate that 
states do not exercise their prerogative to regulate above federal 
pollution standards.  The reasoning behind this seems obvious: in most 
cases, the costs borne by exceeding federal standards fall within the state 
in the form of higher operating costs, job-loss, and taxes.  In such cases, 
states have no incentive to exceed the federal standard, and, therefore, 
they do not.  Where states have extended regulations—for instance, with 
air toxics, they were willing to bear the burdens because internal benefits 
exceeded the costs.  Neither situation presented a collective action problem 
because states were unable to impose costs of increased regulation to 
outside jurisdictions.  Thus, when states have an opportunity to exceed 
federal standards, and when states exercising that right bear the costs of 
so doing, no reason supports preemption.  Indeed, states must retain that 
ability in order to protect the health and welfare of their citizens. 
 49. Peter Henner, Rapanos and Warren—A Tale of Two Cases: The Supreme Court 
Bats .500, 12 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK J. 52, 86 (2007). 
 50. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992). 
 51. Id. at 95. 
 52. Id. at 97. 
 53. Id. at 113-14. 
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Likewise, most attempts by states to assist their citizens where the 
costs fall outside the state cannot be seen as a collective action problem.  
The Clean Air and Clean Water Acts include legislative provisions for 
states to try and control pollution in other states that cross in-state 
boundaries.  Though these controls impose costs to outside states, such 
costs belong to the outside states in the first instance. 
When a pollution-receiving state seeks for pollution-producing states 
to control pollution that crosses state boundaries, the pollution-receiving 
state does create benefits for its citizens and a cost in the pollution-
producing state; but generally, the pollution-receiving state is only 
correcting the pollution-creating state’s attempt to impose costs on it.  
There may arise a situation in which a pollution-receiving state is 
seeking to impose a large cost or additional burden beyond the safe and 
fair level in another state, such as what can occur in a 401-certification 
context or in other water quality contexts.  Though some economic 
arguments claim that these two situations are identical,54 common law 
recognizes the distinction of which party is lawfully entitled to a benefit 
and emphasizes that costs and benefits should be internalized (considered 
by) the decision-making party creating them.55  Thus, when the law prevents 
a “race to the bottom,” as the former example sets forth, it creates an 
economically aligned decision consistent with the common law, whereas 
the latter example produces the opposite result. 
In essence, when a state fails to control its own sources that harm 
other states, it is the result of a real collective action problem, and law 
that prevents this, such as sections 110 and 126 of the Clean Air Act, 
should be enforced.  Therefore, we should encourage any states that 
attempts to induce the EPA to control an outside state’s air pollution that 
causes the state to exceed its NAAQSs, particularly since this would 
directly address the collective action problem. 
In a situation such as Arkansas v. Oklahoma, in which one state tried 
to impose costs that it would not have imposed on itself upon another 
state disproportionate to the benefits, the law did not allow that imposition 
to occur.  The court reasoned that state water quality objections had to be 
reasonable, which is also consistent with the common law.56  In other 
words, the current structure of the federal water pollution control laws 
that are designed to prevent outside states from exporting pollution also 
precludes an affected state from overreaching on pollution control. 
 54. Daniel A. Farber, Parody Lost, Pragmatism Regained: The Ironic History of 
the Coase Theorem, 83 VA. L. REV. 397, 401 (1997). 
 55. Victor B. Flatt, He Should at His Peril Keep It There: How the Common Law 
Tells Us that Risk-Based Corrective Action is Wrong, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 341, 358 
(2001). 
 56. Arkansas, 503 U.S. at 104. 
74 
 
FLATT (DO NOT DELETE) 2/12/2016  12:59 PM 
[VOL. 1:  63, 2009]  State Action in the Environmental Realm 
  SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE AND ENERGY LAW 
Section 401 certifications do seem to present collective-action-problem 
opportunities.  No similar certification provisions exist in the Clean Air 
Act, though the Clean Air Act also prohibits federal agencies from 
taking actions that would harm a state’s air quality.57  This distinction 
may explain how and when preemption may be necessary, which seems 
to turn on the issue of whether the federal government’s decision-
making involves strong deference to states.  In the case of the Clean Air 
Act, though the federal law does not allow a state to cause problems with 
another state’s air quality (as in interstate pollutant transport), the state is 
not the final arbiter of whether such a problem occurs.  Sections 110 and 
126 of the CAA, which address interstate air pollution spillover, vest the 
determination of cause and effect within the EPA.  This is similar to the 
EPA’s ultimate control on recognizing out of state water quality impacts 
under Section 402 of the CWA in the Arkansas v. Oklahoma case.  With 
respect to 401 certification, the states themselves are the final arbiters, 
and their decisions are not necessarily tempered with the reasonableness 
standard that the EPA supplied in Arkansas v. Oklahoma.  Thus, allowing a 
state to set and maintain high standards, even when costs fall outside of 
that state, appears less problematic than failing to provide an effective 
review or reasonableness standard to go along with it. 
One situation in environmental legal history in which a state exceeded 
federal standards that imposed a significant cost outside of that state 
(that is, not for the correction of an external benefit), is the Clean Air 
Act waiver provision, which permits California to exceed federal 
standards in mobile source design.  Republicans in Congress have argued 
that such a policy imposes substantial costs outside of California.58  
However, it seems that significant costs also fall within California—
primarily in the form of higher automobile prices because auto 
manufacturers also have the ability to shift much of costs external to 
California back to California.59 
Does this mean that states should even be allowed to exceed federal 
product standards?  Since even strong environmentalists acknowledge 
the possibility that multiple standards may present too high of a cost to 
 57. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7418 (2009). 
 58. A particular example used is Michigan because of the job losses already occurring 
there in the automobile industry.  See quote from Representative John Boehner, Jan. 26, 
2009, available at http://republicanleader.house.gov/blog/?p=413 (last visited Aug. 3, 
2009). 
 59. Carlson, supra note 9, at 67. 
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business and ultimately the consumer, this is an important question.  No 
clear-cut answer exists, drawing from environmental history.  Certainly, 
many other states have adopted the California automobile standards, as 
permitted by the Clean Air Act, but since the Act does not permit 
multiple state-formulated automobile standards, we do not know what 
states would have opted for had more choices been available. 
Even absent empirical proof, I suggest that it would have been 
unlikely for states to adopt standards beyond the federal or California 
paradigms, primarily because the in-state costs of adopting in state 
specific standards would serve as an incentive to avoid this action.  
California has a huge automobile market.  Through its own standard, 
California raises the price of cars, but because of its large market, the 
prices are not so large per car, and that cost is apparently offset by the 
benefit that California receives in lower air pollution from mobile 
sources.  It is almost impossible to imagine Vermont, or even Iowa, 
doing the same thing.  Even if they had air pollution problems as 
extensive as California’s, a unique market in either of these two states 
would be exceedingly expensive.  For instance, in the case of a state like 
Vermont, the market might be so small that unique standards would 
force all product providers to pull out of the market completely.  These 
smaller-market states, however, can piggyback on California’s standard 
because products are already produced for the California market. 
As far as appliance standards are concerned, only a few states have 
attempted to impose regulatory standards above the federal minimum, 
even in the face of federal inaction.60  And there is evidence from the 
historic pattern of state action and federal response that any action that 
states did take relative to appliance regulation may only have been for 
the sole purpose of pressuring the federal government to adopt a 
standard.61 
A similar analogy can be drawn from state regulation of insurance 
providers.  As the costs of insuring coastal states have increased, insurers 
have indicated that they may pull out of markets completely if the states 
prevent them from recouping costs associated with coastal storms, and 
small states are the most vulnerable to that economic threat.62 
 60. Id. at 65-66. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Christopher Swope, State and Insurers Collide. What Happens when Gulf Coast 
states and Insurers Collide, GOVERNING MAGAZINE, available at http://www.Insurance 
newsnet.com/article.asp?neid=20070218125.18_8f6e012f90943e40 (last visited Aug. 3, 
2009); State Farm to pull out of Florida homeowner’s market, PANTAGRAPH.COM, available at 
http://www.pantagraph.com/articles/2009/01/28/money/doc497f404d0656c167076662.txt 
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Before the modern Clean Air Act, when air pollution was traditionally 
a state concern, only one state—California—had attempted to regulate 
automobile product standards.  This indicates once more the unlikelihood of 
a state adopting a unique product standard to control pollution, and, even 
so, any adoption would only likely occur where both the need was great 
and a market could be supported.  This suggests that, despite rhetoric, in 
terms of product standards and environmental harm, we should generally 
allow states to exceed federal standards since the evidence supports that 
states will only do so where the need is great, and, in such circumstances, 
costs can generally be put back on states that do so.  Certainly, a real 
collective action problem, as defined by Glicksman and Levy, does not 
seem present in such a situation. 
VI.  APPLICATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES 
What does all of this tell us about preemption of state and local 
climate change policies?  The obvious parallel between climate-change-
driven fuel-economy standards and the California Clean Air Act waiver 
provision indicates that the federal government should not preempt state 
fuel standard-setting.  It is hard to imagine that a state would embark on 
higher fuel efficiency standards on its own, unless the need to do so was 
great.  The costs inside the state—from higher auto prices to, possibly, 
the unavailability of the product—would ensure that this would occur 
only in unusual circumstances.  California clearly receives co-benefits in 
other pollution reduction (that is severe in California), which makes this 
step a logical one for that state because the benefits outweigh the costs 
of adopting a unique product standard to control pollution. 
What about cap-and-trade?  Cap-and-trade programs seem mostly 
analogous to criteria pollutant controls through state implementation 
plans—an area in which the states have not taken aggressive action.  
Rather, the federal government has had to force states to meet minimum 
standards.  Before the modern Clean Air Act in 1970, only California 
had serious state environmental controls, and it has not exceeded the 
federal criteria standards since that time; indeed, California has had 
trouble meeting them.63 
One could expect the same consequence of cap-and-trade schemes.  If 
a federal system is in place and working, a state would have negative 
 63. Only Los Angeles was classified as an extreme non-attainment area in the 1990 
amendments to the CAA. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7511 (2009). 
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incentives to run its own program.  For a state to run its own program 
would increase costs on sources that conduct in-state business with very 
few commensurate benefits since the benefits would be global.  Compare 
this model with the controls on hazardous air pollutants, where states 
have been active and benefits accrue locally. 
Though many states have joined some regional greenhouse gas cap-
and-trade control regimes, only California seems to have a serious 
economy-wide cap that could be compared with a stringent federal 
system.  Again, this model is similar to the type that existed before the 
modern Clean Air Act, and it is probable that, even without official 
preemption, states would not undertake a cap-and-trade program unless 
the federal program were ineffective. 
The one plausible exception to this would occur if states became 
wedded to money that could come their way if they sold emissions 
allocations.  In the current budget climate, these monies could provide 
an easy way for states to generate funds without increasing taxes.  This 
situation could result in a collective action problem, but here, once more, 
we do not have enough information.  If such fees were recognized as a 
tax, and if only in-state sources could be brought under an additional 
state cap, then it is still likely that a state would not do so due to the in-
state costs of lost business and higher consumer prices. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
We cannot predict with certainty how states would act if the federal 
government granted them the power to add additional climate-change 
requirements on businesses in their states.  However, from our history 
with other environmental laws, it appears that very little danger of a state 
exceeding a federal pollution control exists, unless the state believed that 
such an additional requirement were necessary to protect the health of its 
own citizens.  Very few opportunities in environmental law permit collective 
action problems—where a state acts to benefit its citizens while imposing 
costs outside of the state.  This may be true even with products, which 
we have generally assumed should fall under one national standard.  
Major climate-change policies seem no different from prior environmental 
laws, indicating that states would act similarly with respect to additional 
climate-change controls. 
Generally, given that federal law should only preempt state law when 
it serves a particularly important purpose, preemption in the climate-
change arena is uncalled for.  However, some exceptions to this principle do 
exist, including considerations of unilateral state health criteria and, 
possibly, receiving monies from cap-and-trade auctions, but these 
exceptions are small.  Overall, environmental law history suggests and 
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supports avoiding preemption in the climate law realm.  States will rarely 
use their power to create unique regulatory schemes, and when they do, 
they only do so when it is necessary to protect the health and well-being 
of their citizens—a state’s most important role. 
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